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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of domestic violence is the subject of increasing national
concern. The extent of domestic violence is difficult to ascertain, pri-
marily because of reluctance within the family unit to publicize conflicts.
The limited statistical evidence that is available is sparse and admittedly
incomplete, but it does indicate that one form of domestic violence,
spouse abuse, occurs once every eighteen seconds in the United States.'
Legislative and judicial bodies, as well as social agencies, experiment
with a variety of methods to combat this domestic violence epidemic.
These "solutions" range from counseling for the victim, offender, or
family, to the more recent increase in criminal prosecutions of the
abuser. This Note discusses and recommends a program that takes the
best from these methods in an effort to effectively address domestic
violence.
This Note specifically addresses domestic violence between spouses,
former spouses, and unmarried couples living in the same household.
The term spouse is used regardless of the legal status of the couple.
Although husband abuse occurs, wife abuse is a more common problem. 2
Consequently, this Note discusses spouse abuse from the female victim's
perspective. Most of the principles discussed, however, can also b~e
applied to the battered husband.3 This Note first considers the problem
of spouse abuse4 generally, its recognition, and initial attempts to deal
with the problem. Following a brief review of formal pretrial diversion
and its recent uses, the propriety of pretrial diversion in the prosecution
of spousal abuse cases is considered. Finally, this Note discusses the
circumstances under which pretrial diversion is most effective in spouse
abuse cases.
A. The Recognition of the Spouse Abuse Problem and Initial Attempts
at Solution
Although interspousal violence is a pervasive problem, it is one of
the most neglected. Society and the legal justice system have shown a
1. Moore, Editor's Introduction in BATTERED WOMEN 14 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id.
4. The terms "abuse," "assault," or "battering" represent any acts carried out with
the intention of, or perceived intention of, physically injuring one's spouse. The problem
of mental abuse is beyond the scope of this Note.
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general unwillingness to invade the family unit and involve themselves
in such conflicts. Unfortunately, this attitude, based primarily on tra-
ditional privacy considerations, overlooks the problem.
In the last two decades, the problem of spouse battering has received
increased attention. Initial attempts at dealing with spouse abuse, how-
ever, reflected the view that these occurrences of violence were not real
crimes, and the courts should not interfere with the sanctity of the
family. Early efforts included hotlines and shelters for battered women.5
These efforts increased the attention given to the problems of the battered
spouse, yet did little more than provide on the spot relief or advice for
a limited number of battered women.6
Since 1970, there has been a significant increase in spouse abuse
research, and a corresponding increase in the attention given to the
results of that research. This is largely due to the women's movement,
which has focused attention on all aspects of the oppression of women,
and has begun to change the cultural norms supporting abuse. 7 Dis-
couragingly, this change in social views has been slow.
Martha and Henry Fields state in their 1973 article8 that the criminal
justice system is ineffective in achieving deterrence, incapacitation,
prevention, retribution, or rehabilitation in spousal abuse cases. They
also assert that the dynamics of violent intimate relationships "place
them more appropriately within the bailiwick of the helping professions." 9
Unfortunately, the beginning of public, legislative, and judicial awareness
of domestic violence between spouses in the 1970s reflected much the
same view. Treating the family or couple together instead of focusing
on the batterer and his violent behavior was a typical initial solution
aimed at spousal abuse. One of the earliest studies in the spousal
violence field examined projects which developed new ways to handle
domestic cases.'0 The author of this study, Raymond Parmas, favors
using informal prosecution hearings, information and referral programs,
arbitration, peace bonds, and family courts in order to avoid prosecution
of family cases, thereby channeling such cases to social service personnel
5. L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 1 (1981).
6. Shelters do, however, provide vital and essential support services for battered women
such as housing, emotional assistance, and a safe place from which to pursue legal
remedies. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATrERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 96 (1982) [hereinafter RULE OF THUMB].
7. Couch, Research on Wife Abuse: A Scan of Literature, in ABUSE OF WOMEN:
LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION 1 (J. Costa ed. 1983).
8. Field & Field, Marital Violence and the Criminal Process: Neither Justice nor
Peace, 47 Soc. REV. 221, 227 (1973).
9. Id.
10. Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRIM. L.
BULL. 733 (1973).
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and psychologists. The study points out that prosecutors are ill-equipped
to perform psychoanalysis, and, therefore, unable to deliver the primary
counseling services needed by violent families. I" Although the spousal
violence problem was recognized, it was treated in a noncriminal manner
and channeled away from the traditional criminal justice system.
By 1977, commentators were addressing the problems generated by
the treatment for domestic violence in the 1970s. An article by Sue
Eisenburg and Patricia Micklow took a different approach from previous
studies. 12 The Eisenberg-Micklow Article criticized crisis intervention
and arbitration techniques as relying too heavily upon mediation and
conciliation "with the effect of depreciating the severity of the com-
plaints," and translating "patterns of repetitive, serious, violent behavior
into social disturbances, family spats, or quarrels."' 13 Suggested alter-
natives included improved reporting of domestic violence calls to facil-
itate the identification of serious cases, limited use of pretrial detention,
explicit prosecution guidelines on the exercise of discretion in filing
charges, and judicial insistence on complete records in spouse abuse
cases.'
4
During the last decade there has been a trend toward reducing the
court time spent on "minor disputes" by instituting mediation programs. 5
The prevailing attitude toward domestic violence as a less serious crime
than one perpetrated upon a stranger resulted in mediation programs
-receiving the bulk of domestic abuse cases. During mediation, both
parties are asked to pinpoint sources of frustration in their relationship,
and to suggest solutions to the problems they identify. 6 This process
may produce a written agreement, possibly sealed by the court, but it
is generally not enforceable. 7
Mediation programs represent one of the more recent trends in the
treatment of spousal violence. A strong argument can be made in favor
of mediation if the only goals are reconciliation and keeping the family
unit together. Unfortunately, the balance of power in most violent
relationships conflicts with the underlying concept of mediation-that
of two equal parties meeting with a neutral third party to work out
differences. Generally, both the victim and the abuser blame the victim
11. Id. at 759.
12. Eisenburg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: Catch 22 Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP. 138 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 10.
13. Eisenburg & Micklow, supra note 12, at 160.
14. Id. at 161.
15. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 66 (citing R. COOK, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE
CENTERS FIELD TEST: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 1-7, (1980) (available from the
National Institute of Justice)).
16. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 66.
17. Id.
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for the violence, and mediation provides yet another opportunity for the
batterer to explain exactly what it is about the victim's behavior that
provokes him to beat her. 8 "Mediation allows the husband to negotiate
a change in his wife's behavior and fails to send a message to the
batterer that he is responsible for his conduct and that his conduct is
wrong."' 9 Moreover, "mediation may actually perpetuate battering by
protecting the batterer from criminal sanctions. '20 The batterer's belief
in his right to beat his spouse is reinforced by absolving him of blame
for his actions and insulating him from social stigma.
21
Many advocates "argue other options are better at reducing violence
than mediation. '2 2 These advocates urge that "the relegation of domestic
violence cases to mediation assumes the injuries involved are trivial ,' 23
and the message communicated to a battered spouse when denied the
right to see a judge is that the spouse has no enforceable right not to
be beaten. 24 Further, even if mediation does result in an enforceable
agreement prohibiting violence, it may not be helpful in deterring the
abuser since the violence is already illegal.
While mediation may not be the preferred response to spousal violence,
there are instances where mediation is the only option available to deal
with the abusive situation. A victim may not desire or may be afraid
to file charges against her attacker because "she will lose control over
the use of less drastic measures, and because she fears the public
exposure of prosecution." 25 Additionally, the abuser may perceive me-
diators as less threatening than prosecutors or judges, and thus be less
defensive and more willing to seek counseling. 26 It may be that prose-
cution is not a viable option because evidence is insufficient to support
a conviction. Thus, mediation programs permit some response to the
violence where there otherwise is none.27
Civil action by the battered spouse is another possible response to
the domestic abuse problem.2 Traditionally, interspousal tort suits were
unavailable for domestic abuse due to interspousal tort immunity.29
18. Id. at 69.
19. Stallone, Decriminalization of Violence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Battering
Cases, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 493, 518 (1984).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 68.
23. Id.
24. Fields, Wife Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 252 (1978).
25. N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW
214 (1987).
26. Id. at 216.
27. Id. at 217.
28. Note, Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey and
Suggestions for Reform, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 263 (1983).
29. Id.
418
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Today, civil action is more feasible because most jurisdictions reject all
arguments favoring this immunity and construe the Married Women's
Acts as authorizing a tort action by either spouse against the other.30
Civil suits for personal injury are suggested as an acceptable alter-
native to criminal prosecutions by Martha and Henry Fields. The authors
suggest tendering civil suits for personal injury as an alternative to the
ineffective criminal justice system.3 Even though civil action is one
avenue of recourse available to the battered spouse, it does not provide
a complete remedy. The abused party may receive compensation for
injuries through civil suit, however, tort liability does not provide the
necessary physical protection for spouses,32 nor does it bring the violence
properly within the reach of criminal law.
B. Spouse Abuse and the Criminal Justice System
Although mediation programs are generally used ,and accepted, the
trend is toward treating these offenses in a more criminal manner. The
use of protective orders against the batterer, warrantless and immediate
arrest statutes, and more frequent prosecution of batterers demonstrates
that marital violence is being treated more seriously, even if not yet
treated on par with assaults between strangers.
30. The following 29 states have abolished interspousal tort immunity: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Penton v. Penton, 223
Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Leach v.
Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d
70 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Silverman v. Silverman, 145
Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949);
Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d
116 (Ky. 1968); United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (Louisiana);
Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138
N.W.2d 343 (1965); Beaudette v. Franna, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Imig
v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528
P.2d 1013 (1974); Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959); Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d
947 (1975); Weicker v. Weicker, 28 A.D.2d 138, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967); Bogen v.
Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191,
242 N.W. 526 (1932); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Fowler
v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298
N.W. 266 (1941); Bounda v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977); Richard v. Richard,
131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200
(1971); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1962); Bodenhagen v. Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 95 N.W.2d 822 (1959). Along with Illinois' recent enactment
of the Domestic Violence Act, the legislature provided that spouses can sue the other
spouse, but only for intentional torts resulting in physical harm. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 1001 (1981).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 267.
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1. Police. Police handling of domestic violence cases is fundamental
to successful prosecution and deterrence of spouse batterers. Although
a victim of domestic violence may file a private criminal complaint or
seek civil relief, in the vast majority of spouse abuse cases, a police
officer is the first, if not the only representative of the justice system
with whom a battered spouse has any contact.13 Unfortunately, police
are reluctant to file reports or to take batterers into custody. This is
partly because so few domestic cases result in prosecution and police
believe their time could be better spent. Police also traditionally view
most incidents of spouse abuse as private matters that are best resolved
by the parties themselves. 34 There may also be difficulties in finding a
legal basis for such arrests.35
One legal constraint on police arrests of batterers is the fourth
amendment. 36 The police must have probable cause to believe a crime
has been committed by the person arrested.37 State law cannot abolish
this requirement, however, within the limits of the fourth amendment,
the state prescribes the standard for arrest in criminal cases.38 If domestic
abuse is treated as a misdemeanor, arrests become even more difficult
as most state laws generally permit warrantless arrests when there is
probable cause that a felony has been committed but only upon witnessing
the commission of a misdemeanor.39 These laws discourage arrests in
most domestic abuse cases because injury is often not visible, and police
rarely witness the assault.40 New warrantless arrest statutes,41 which
allow arrests when violence is likely, are an important step in triggering
the criminal justice system to reduce violence.42 Warrantless arrests
mean immediate arrests are possible, further injury to the victim is
avoided, and violent behavior is punished.4 3
There are negative aspects of a more frequent arrest policy. An arrest
may make the offender more angry and abusive under some circum-
stances,44 or may result in fewer reported incidents if the victim does
33. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 6, at 12.
34. Id. at 21.
35. See generally L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 121-23.
36. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 121.
38. Id. at 124.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 132.
42. Id. at 126.
43. See generally id. at 124-29. A majority of states allow warrantless arrests if
probable cause is present, while a growing minority of state statutes provide for mandatory
arrests in certain domestic violence situations. Lerman, Landis & Goldzweig, State Leg-
islation on Domestic Violence, 4(7) RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 10, 11
(1981).
44. Comment, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or Al-
ternative, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 243, 246 (1985).
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not want to see the batterer arrested and prosecuted. 45 Additionally,
more frequent arrests without a resulting prosecution weakens the mes-
sage that domestic violence is a crime. 46
Those dangers, however, are outweighed by the benefits of a more
frequent arrest policy. An increase in arrests will lead to more frequent
prosecution of domestic violence cases,47 an increase in the likelihood
of victim cooperation and courage to correct her situation,48 and will
"communicate to the parties [involved] that the abuser has committed
a crime and the victim has a right not to be beaten. '49
2. Prosecution. "For centuries prosecutors have assumed that do-
mestic violence is a minor problem, that for a man to strike his wife
is a legitimate exercise of his authority to discipline her, that women
provoke the beatings they receive, or that they enjoy them."50 Traditional
attitudes toward crime and family life encourage prosecutors to regard
spouse abuse as outside their jurisdiction. This prosecutorial response
is reinforced by negative experiences in prosecuting spouse abuse casesY.5
The institutional process leads prosecutors to prefer expending their
efforts on cases in which the chance of conviction and serious penalty
are likely, and to seek diversion or dismissal of cases considered poor
risks.52 Domestic abuse cases are poor risks for conviction. This is due
to a lack of evidence to support one or more elements of the offense. 53
The offense is often committed behind closed doors and testimonial
evidence by the victim is often not credible to the jury.54 The victim
may also be uncooperative, 55 or may decide to drop charges against the
offender.5 6 With these factors in mind, it is not surprising that the rate
of prosecution and conviction decreases sharply when there is a rela-
tionship between the alleged assailant and the victim.57
Nevertheless, there are many reasons supporting prosecution as the
appropriate course in domestic abuse cases. "The prosecutor exerts
considerable influence over the police, sending officers formal and
informal messages on the content of criminal statutes, the priority
45. Id. at 259.
46. Id. at 255.
47. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 119.
48. Id. at 120.
49. Id. at 121.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 6, at 23.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Stanko, Would You Believe This Woman?, in JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF
68 (1982).
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id.
57. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 6, at 30.
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assigned to various law enforcement problems, and ... changing policies
or guidelines.""8 Thus, the willingness of police to arrest batterers
becomes a function of the prosecutor's willingness to follow up those
arrests with prosecution. Additionally, the failure of the criminal justice
system to enforce the law against batterers via prosecution contributes
to the perpetuation of violence within the family59 and affirms society's
view of family violence as less serious than crime between strangers.
Fortunately, attitudes of prosecutors are changing and the prosecution
of domestic violence is receiving greater attention. In 1978, prosecutors
nationwide attended a conference on the prosecution of batterers spon-
sored by the National Attorney's Association and The Center for Wom-
en's Policy Studies. The conference report states that the participants
agreed that "spouse assault is just as criminal as violent conduct between
other people and should not be treated less seriously by the criminal
justice system."60 This belief is reflected in the movement away from
informal procedures6 and the increased use of formal criminal charges
in domestic assault cases.12
The recognition of spouse abuse as criminal behavior was the first
crucial step. At least "a handful of prosecutors around the country have
made abuse cases a priority and aggressively prosecute cases involving
intimates. ' 63 Prosecutors in Seattle, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, Phil-
adelphia, New York, among others, have adopted procedures that reduce
pressures on the complainant, and reduce case attrition.64 Prosecutors
are beginning to regard spouse abuse as a crime against the state, and
view the decision to prosecute an abuse case as the prosecutor's re-
sponsibility, not the responsibility of the victim.
II. PRETRIAL DIVERSION
A. Introduction
Although the problem of domestic violence is an old one, formal
pretrial diversion of criminal offenders is somewhat new. The term
"diversion" is defined as the channeling of criminal defendants into
rehabilitative programs after a criminal complaint has been filed.65 The
58. Id. at 23.
59. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 13.
60. Id. at 5 (citing T. Fromson, Prosecutor's Responsibility in Spouse Abuse Cases
(1980) (on file at the Center for Women Policy Studies)).
61. Mediation and crisis intervention, for example. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 33.
64. Id. at 33-34.
65. Laszio & McKean, Court Diversion: An Alternative for Spousal Abuse Cases, in
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 330
(1978).
422
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term implies a halting or suspending of formal criminal proceedings
against the alleged criminal perpetrator in favor of a noncriminal pro-
ceeding which, if successful, is the final disposition of the criminal
offense."
The pretrial ... "diversion" program represents one of the most promising
correctional treatment innovations in recent years. Adaptable both to adult
and juvenile correctional populations, the concept has received increasing
recognition and endorsement as a rehabilitative technique for early and
youthful offenders .... The technique is to be distinguished from informal
diversion practices ... in that pretrial [diversion] referrals are based on (i)
formalized eligibility criteria, (ii) required participation in manpower, coun-
seling, job placement, and educational services for defendants placed in the
programs, and (iii) utilization of a real alternative to official court processing,
i.e. dismissal of formal charges for successful participants.67
Pretrial diversion programs are based on the belief that not every
criminal violation warrants a formal courtroom prosecution. 6 The sub-
jects of diversion have fallen into two general groups. One such group
is comprised of persons charged with offenses of arguably dubious
criminality, such as drug abuse and juvenile offenses. 69 A second group
includes persons for whom ordinary criminal processing may be inef-
fectual, such as misdemeanants, juveniles, and domestic assaulters.7 0
The rationale for using diversion in both groups is the avoidance of
costly criminal processing "of questionable benefit to the individual and
society, while maintaining social controls through services aimed at
altering behavior."'" Thus, through pretrial diversion, the benefits of
rehabilitative social services can be received without allowing the of-
fender to completely escape criminal culpability.
In the past, the term "diversion" has been used for programs designed
to completely remove cases from the traditional court process, i.e. giving
the violence no criminal treatment at all. These diversion programs
included mediation, arbitration, and family counseling. This Note refers
to diversion in a different context: the diversion of the spouse batterer
into some type of rehabilitative process after the filing of a criminal
complaint, but prior to trial, conviction, or adjudication. The process is
not a channeling of the offender away from the traditional court proc-
66. Id. (citing report of the Corrections Task Force of the National Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973)).
67. Hopkins, Foreword to NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER,
MONOGRAPH ON LEGAL ISSUES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS at i (1974).
68. Annotation, Pretrial Diversiorn Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or
Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant's Consent to Noncriminal Alternative,
4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 151 (1981).
69. Robertson, Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52 B.U.L.
REV. 335, 335 (1972).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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essing of criminal acts, but a diversion process working in conjunction
with the trial court. The courtroom is the starting point in many cases,
and remains the final forum for unsuccessful diversion cases. What is
suggested is the use of pretrial diversion in spousal abuse cases in the
same way it is used in diversion of other criminal offense cases. Diversion
should be used when it appears to be a more effective means of
rehabilitation through the use of existing social service agencies. The
diversion cannot be permitted to stray too far from the traditional legal
system or it will not prohibit batterers from escaping criminal culpability
for continued abusive behavior.
B. Is Diversion an Appropriate Means of Dealing with Spouse Abuse?
Placing aside the initial difficulties of bringing a domestic violence
case to the prosecution stage, such as police nonarrest and lack of
formal complaint filing, there are other characteristics of the spouse
assault crime that limit its applicability to typical pretrial diversion
statutes. Section 2935.36 of the Ohio Revised Code 2 provides for the
72. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (Anderson 1980) provides as follows:
(A) The prosecuting attorney may establish pretrial diversion programs for adults who
are accused of committing criminal offenses and whom he believes will probably
offend again. The programs shall be operated pursuant to written standards
approved by the presiding judge or, in courts with only one judge, the judge of
the court of common pleas and shall not be applicable to any of the following:
(1) Repeat offenders or dangerous offenders, as defined in section 2903.06, 2903.07,
2905.04, 2907.05, 2907.21, 2907.22, 2907.31, 2907.32, 2907.34, 2911.31, 2919.12,
2919.13, 2919.22, 2921.11, 2921.12, 2921.32, 2923.04, or 2923.20 of the Revised
Code, with the exception that the prosecuting attorney may permit persons
accused of such offenses to enter a pre-trial diversion program, if he finds any
of the following:
(a) The accused did not cause, threaten, or intend serious physical harm to any
person;
(b) The offense was the result of circumstances not likely to recur;
(c) The accused has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity;
(d) The accused has led a law-abiding life for a substantial time before commission
of the alleged offense;
(e) Substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the offense;
(3) Persons accused of a violation of Chapter 2925. or 3719. of the Revised Code;
(4) Drug dependent persons or persons in danger of becoming drug dependent
persons, as defined in section 3719.011 [3719.01.1] of the Revised Code.
(B) An accused who enters a diversion program shall:
(1) Waive, in writing and contingent upon his successful completion of the program,
his right to a speedy trial, the preliminary hearing, the time period which the
grand jury must review the offense with which he is charged and to the
conditions of the diversion program established by the prosecuting attorney.
(C) The trial court, upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, shall order the
release from confinement of any accused who has agreed to enter a pre-trial
diversion program and shall discharge and release any existing bail and release
any sureties on recognizances and shall release the accused on a recognizance
bond conditioned upon the accused's compliance with the terms of the diversion
program. The victim of the crime and the arresting officers shall have the
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pretrial diversion of criminal offenders. Ohio's statute is representative
of those state statutes with diversion provisions, most of which typically
provide for prosecutorial discretion regarding the criminal defendants'
eligibility for diversion programs.73 The Ohio statute prohibits certain
types of offenders from using the diversion process. Those prohibited
opportunity to file written objections with the prosecuting attorney prior to the
commencement of the pre-trial diversion program.
(D) If the accused satisfactorily completes the diversion program, the prosecuting
attorney shall recommend to the trial court that the charges against the accused
be dismissed, and the court shall, upon recommendation of the prosecuting attorney,
dismiss the charges. If the accused chooses not to enter the prosecuting attorney's
diversion program, or if the accused violates the conditions of the agreement
pursuant to which he has been released, he may be brought to trial upon the
charges in the manner provided by law, and the waiver executed pursuant to
division (B)(1) of this section shall be void on the date the accused is removed
from the program for the violation.
73. See also FLA. STAT. aa 944.025 (1979) which provides as follows:
(1) The department shall supervise pretrial intervention programs for persons charged
with a crime, before or after any information has been filed or an indictment has
been returned in the circuit court. Such programs shall provide appropriate
counseling, education, supervision, and medical and psychological treatment as
available and when appropriate for the persons released to such programs.
(2) Any first offender, or any person previously convicted of no more than one
nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the
third degree is eligible for release to the pretrial intervention program on the
approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the
state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of
the offender. In no case, however, shall any individual be so released unless, after
consultation with his attorney or one made available to him if he is indigent, he
has voluntarily agreed to such program and has knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a speedy trial for the period of his diversion. In no case shall the
defendant or his immediate family personally contact the victim or his immediate
family to acquire the victim's consent under the provisions of this act.
(3) The criminal charges against an individual admitted to the program shall be
continued without final disposition for a period of 90 days from the date the
individual was released to the program, if the offender's participation in the
program is satisfactory, and for an additional 90 days upon the request of the
program administrator and consent of the state attorney, if the offender's partic-
ipation in the program is satisfactory.
(4) Resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time if
the program administrator or state attorney find such individual is not fulfilling
his obligations under this plan or if the public interest so requires.
(5) At the end of the intervention period, the administrator shall recommend:
(a) That the end revert to normal channels for prosecution in instances in which
the offender's participation in the program has been unsatisfactory;
(b) That the offender is in need of further supervision; or
(c) That dismissal of charges without prejudice shall be entered in instances in
which prosecution is not deemed necessary. The state attorney shall make the
final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue.
(6) The chief judge in each circuit may appoint an advisory committee for the pretrial
diversion program. Said committee shall be composed of the chief judge or his
designate, who shall serve as chairman; the state attorney, public defender, and
program administrator, or their representatives; and such other persons as the
chairman shall deem appropriate. The committee may also include persons rep-
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include repeat offenders or persons accused of a violent offense.74 These
individuals are excluded because public policy compels avoiding risks
to the community's safety during the participation period.71
Initially, it appears that pretrial diversion is inappropriate for domestic
abuse cases because they undoubtedly involve violent offenses and are
often repeated occurrences. 76 Yet, the same reasons that lead to the
informal diversion of batterers (noncriminal handling), point to formal
pretrial diversion as appropriate. These reasons are: judicial economy,
criminal justice resources, 77 victims' unwillingness to testify resulting in
no-win cases,78 parties' desire to preserve whatever is left of a marital
relationship,79 and intrafamily assault cases frequently characterized by
the victim and the offender as noncriminal.8 0 The fact that violence
occurs in a family setting does not change its criminal character 8'
however, it may affect the level of the participant's committment to
the diversion program and thus facilitate the attainment of program
goals. Although the rationale behind the formal diversion of spouse
batterers is similar to the justification for use of the earlier informal
processes, formal diversion should be more effective in dealing with the
abuse problem. Contrary to the more informal diversion tactics such as
mediation, formal diversion programs focus on the criminal behavior of
the batterer and do not let him share the blame with the victim. Formal
programs also have a coercive effect upon the batterer by sending the
case back to be prosecuted if the diversion program is not successfully
completed. 82 Furthermore, diversion has an advantage over prosecution
because it can be accomplished more swiftly than prosecution, thus
taking advantage of the batterer's strong motivation to stop battering
during the contrite loving stage. 3
resenting any other agencies to which person released to the pretrial intervention
program may be referred.
(7) The department may contract for the services and facilities necessary to operate
pretrial intervention programs.
74. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36(A)(1) and (2) (Anderson 1980).
75. NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, MONOGRAPH ON LEGAL
ISSUES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 40 (1974) [here-
inafter MONOGRAPH].
76. Note, Domestic Relations, Legal Responses to Wife Battering: Theory and Practice
in Ohio, 16 AKRON L. REV. 705, 738 (1983).
77. Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion, Motivation,
and Formalization, 48 DEN. L.J. 211, 223 (1971).
78. Id. at 224.
79. R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION
31 (1974).
80. Id.
81. Stallone, supra note 19, at 518.
82. Laszio & McKean, supra note 65, at 355.
83. Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 325 (1985).
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There are, of course, problems with using pretrial diversion in spouse
abuse cases. Advocates for battered women disagree regarding the
desirability of diversion. Some believe that diversion sanctions under-
enforcement of the criminal law.84 By consistently diverting domestic
violence cases, a message is communicated to the community that the
problem is not a serious crime, rather it is a private matter.85 Even
formal diversion programs will not be effective in cases involving repeat
offenders or hardened criminals. Thus, these programs cannot be used
as a dumping ground for "minor disputes" without regard to the needs
of battered women, the offenders, and society's interest in the censure
of domestic violence.86 Nevertheless, in cases involving less serious injury
or first time offenders, a well planned program of diversion with pros-
ecution deferred may be effective.8 7
The remainder of this Note considers the provisions of some state
statutes for the process, the characteristics of particular abuse cases
that may or may not make them appropriate for diversion, and the
circumstances under which a diversion process can be effective in spouse
abuse cases without perpetuating the view that domestic violence is not
a serious crime.
C. Current Statutory Programs
A pretrial diversion program may be established by statute, by court
rule, or by administrative policy. 8 Although statutory authority is not
required to set up a diversion program, implementation of statewide
programs may be facilitated by legislation setting forth procedures for
diversion. Such legislation helps keep consistency in the types of de-
fendants admitted into diversion programs, and sets a range within which
a prosecutor's discretion must work. Many state statutes establish pretrial
diversion programs similar to section 2935.36 of the Ohio Revised Code s9
but only a few contain provisions aimed specifically at diversion of
spouse batterers.
Legislation on diversion of domestic violence offenders has been passed
in Michigan,90 Wisconsin,91 and Arizona.92 The Michigan statute93 pro-
vides for "probation" after a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the
84. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 61, 135 (1985) [hereinafter A Model State Act].
85. Note, supra note 76, at 737.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 93.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
90. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 769.4a (West 1982).
91. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.37 (West 1985).
92. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3601 (Supp. 1986).
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.4a (West 1982) provides as follows:
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court, but prior to the entering of a guilty judgment. 94 Any further
proceedings are deferred while the defendant adheres to the conditions
of his "probation," which may or may not include counseling or other
conditions. 9 "Upon the fulfillment of the conditions and the conclusion
of the probationary period, the court will discharge the offender and
dismiss the proceedings against [him]." ' 96 Hence, there is no conviction
and no record except those kept for the purpose of determining future
eligibility under the diversion statute. 97
Wisconsin law98 provides for the prosecutor to enter into an agreement
with the defendant in writing in which the defendant waives his right
to a speedy trial, tolls the statute of limitations, and agrees to file
monthly reports with the prosecutor certifying his compliance with the
Sec. 4a (1) When a person, who has not been convicted previously of a violation
of section 81 or 81a of Act N. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, as amended,
being sections 750.81 and 750.8 1 a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and the victim
of the assault is the offender's spouse, former spouse, or a person residing or
having resided in the same household as the victim, pleads guilty to, or is found
guilty of, a violation of section 81 or 81a of Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of
1931, as amended, the court, without entering judgment of guilt, and with consent
of the accused, may defer further proceedings and place the accused on probation
as provided in this section. Upon violation of a term or condition of probation,
the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided
in this chapter.
(2) An order of probation entered under subsection (1) may require the accused to
participate in a mandatory counseling program. The court may order the accused
to pay the reasonable costs of the program.
(3) Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall discharge the person
and dismiss the proceedings against the person. Discharge and dismissal under
this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for
purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a
crime.
(4) There may be only 2 discharges and dismissal under this section with respect to
any person. The department of state police shall retain a nonpublic record of an
arrest and discharge under this section. This record shall be furnished to a court
or police agency upon request for the purpose of showing that a defendant in a
criminal action under section 81 or 81a of Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of
1931, as amended, has already once availed himself or herself to this section.
94. Id. at § 769.4a(l).
95. Id. at § 769.4a(2).
96. Id. at § 769.4a(3).
97. Id. at § 769.4a(4).
98. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.37 (West 1985) provides as follows:
(1) In this section, "child sexual abuse" means an alleged violation of § 940.203,
940.225 or 944.06 if the alleged victim is a minor and the person accused of,
charged with, the violation:
(a) Lives with or has lived with the minor;
(b) Is nearer of kin to the alleged victim than a 2nd cousin;
(c) Is a guardian or legal custodian of the minor; or
(d) Is or appears to be in a position of power or control over the minor.
(m)(a) The district attorney may enter into a deferred prosecution agreement under
this section with a person accused of, or charged with, child sexual abuse
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diversion agreement. 9 Either the prosecutor or the defendant can ter-
minate the agreement and proceed with prosecution."l 0 Upon completion
of the program, the court will dismiss with prejudice all charges. 10
In the Arizona statute, 02 the diversion program is unavailable to
defendants with a prior criminal record or prior experience with a
or a violation of aa 813.12(8) or aa 940.19(1) or (1m) if the violation
constitutes domestic abuse as defined in aa 46.95(l)(a).
(b) The agreement shall provide that the prosecution will be suspended for a
specified period if the person complies with conditions specified in the agreement.
The agreement shall be in writing, signed by the district attorney or his or her
designee and the person, and shall provide that the person waives his or her
right to a speedy trial and that the agreement will toll any applicable civil or
criminal statute of limitations during the period of the agreement, and, fur-
thermore, that the person shall file with the district attorney a monthly written
report certifying his or her compliance with the conditions specified in the
agreement. The district attorney shall provide the spouse of the accused person
and the alleged victim or the parent or guardian of the alleged victim with a
copy of the agreement.
(2) The written agreement shall be terminated and the prosecution may resume upon
written notice by either the person or the district attorney to the other prior
completion of the period of the agreement.
(3) Upon completion of the period of the agreeient, if the agreement has not been
terminated under sub. (2), the court shall dismiss, with prejudice, any charge or
charges against the person in connection with the crime specified in sub. (1m),
or if no such charges have been filed, none may be filed.
(4) Consent to a deferred prosecution under this section is not an admission of guilt
and the .onsent may not be admitted in evidence in a trial for the crime specified
in sub. (Im), except if relevant to questions concerning the statute of limitations
or lack of speedy trial. No statement relating to the crime, made by the person
in connection with any discussion concerning deferred prosecution or to any person
involved in a program in which the person must participate as a condition of the
agreement, is admissible in a trial for the crime specified in sub. (Im).
(5) This section does not preclude use of deferred prosecution agreements for any
alleged violations not subject to this section.
99. Id. at § 971.37(1)(Im)(b).
100. Id. at § 971.37(1)(lm)(b)(2).
101. Id. at aa 971.37(1)(lm)(b)(4).
102. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.3601 (Supp. 1986) provides as follows:
A. "Domestic violence" means any act which is a dangerous crime against children
as defined in 13-604.01 or an offense defined in 13-1201 through 13-1204, 13-
1302 through 13-1304, 13-1502 and 13-1602 and 13-2904, subsection A, paragraphs
1, 2, 3 and 6, if the relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of
marriage or former marriage or of person of the opposite sex residing or having
resided in the same household or if the victim and defendant or the defendant's
spouse are related to each other by consanguinuity or affinity of the second degree.
B. A peace officer may, with or without a warrant, arrest a person if he has probable
cause to believe that domestic violence has been committed and he has probable
cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the offense, whether
such offense is a felony or misdemeanor and whether such offense was committed
within or without the presence of the peace officer. The release procedures available
under 13-3883, paragraph 4 and 13-3903 are not applicable to arrest made pursuant
to this subsection.
C. A person arrested pursuant to subsection B of this section may be released from
custody in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure or other applicable
statute. Any order of release, with or without an appearance bond, shall include
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diversion program. 0 3 Similar to the Michigan statute, the diversion
occurs after conviction but prior to final adjudication.
In all of the statutes discussed, the prosecutor has wide discretion
in deciding which cases should be diverted, limited only by prior
conviction or prior diversion experience.'04 Thus, prosecutors play a
central role in successful implementation of diversion statutes. More
specific eligibility requirements may be helpful in guiding the prose-
cutor's discretion in determining admittance to the diversion program. 05
This avoids the danger of the program becoming a dumping ground for
case overload, and maintains consistency in the types of defendants
admitted.
-III. WHEN IS DIVERSION APPROPRIATE IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES?
A. General Diversion Eligibility
Formal pretrial diversion programs are not always appropriate in
spouse abuse cases, just as they are not always appropriate in other
pretrial release conditions necessary to provide for the protection of the alleged
victim and other specifically designated persons and may provide for additional
conditions which the court deems appropriate, including participation in any
counseling programs available to the defendant.
D. When a peace officer responds to a call alleging that domestic violence has been
or may be committed, the officer shall inform any alleged or potential victim of
the procedures and resources available for the protection of such victim including:
1. An order of protection pursuant to 13)3602 and an injunction pursuant to 25-
315.
2. The emergency telephone number for the local police agency.
3. Telephone numbers for emergency services in the local community.
E. A peace officer is not civilly liable for noncompliance with subsection D of this
section.
F. An offense included in domestic violence carries the classification prescribed in
the section of this title in which the offense is classified.
G. If the defendant is found guilty of an offense included in domestic violence and
if probation is otherwise available for such offense, the court may, without entering
a judgment of guilty and with the concurrence of the prosecutor and consent of
the defendant, defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation as
provided in this subsection. The terms and conditions of probation shall include
those necessary to provide for the protection of the alleged victim and other
specifically designated persons and additional conditions and requirements which
the court deems appropriate, including any counseling or diversionary programs
available to the defendant. On violation of a term or condition of probation, the
court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided for
revocation of probation. On fulfillment of the terms and conditions of probation,
the court shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings against the
defendant. This subsection does not apply in any case in which the defendant has
previously been found guilty under this section, or in which charges under this
section have been previously dismissed in accordance with this subsection.
103. Id. at § 13.3601(G).
104. See supra notes 93, 98.
105. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 137.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
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criminal cases. 06 There are some factors which make diversion appro-
priate in both spouse abuse cases and other criminal cases, but other
factors exist precluding diversion in most criminal cases, although not
necessarily precluding diversion's effectiveness in a spouse abuse case.
Common among pretrial diversion programs is the requirement that the
participant be a "nonhardened offender,"107 or rather, a first-time or
youthful offender. The first-time offender requirement is based on the
public policy of avoiding risk to community safety during the diversionary
period. 0 This requirement applies equally to domestic violence offenders.
Repeat abusers, or at least those with prior convictions, 09 are often
excluded from formal pretrial diversion programs. 10 Other programs
exclude defendants with a prior arrest for any violent crime."'
Generally, pretrial diversion programs are based upon voluntary par-
ticipation. 12 Although voluntary participation is needed to insure that
the defendant's rights are not violated, it is not clear that diversion
programs would be ineffective otherwise. "[Many] mental health prac-
titioners believe that counseling is ineffective unless the client's partic-
ipation is voluntary, [but] experience with court-mandated treatment
for abusers suggests that the opposite may be true.""' 3 It is characteristic
of spouse batterers to deny responsibility for their abusive conduct, and
to be unwilling to seek help." 4 "Also, [abusers] are often more externally
motivated [than other types of offenders] and do what is required of
them more willingly than when they take steps by themselves to change
their behavior.""' 5 Few batterers seek treatment on their own, yet when
counseling is ordered by a court, many are receptive to therapy.1' 6 It
appears that the coercive effect of the deferred prosecution may actually
make batterers more responsive to counseling and rehabilitative programs
by providing an external motivation. Regardless, voluntary participation
remains a requirement of both statutory diversion programs" 7 and most
model diversion statutes aimed at domestic violence cases." 8
107. R. NIMMER, supra note 79, at 50.
108. MONOGRAPH, supra note 67, at 40.
109. It is an unusual case where the victim of spousal abuse resorts to arrest and
prosecution after the first incident of violence.
110. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.4a(1) (West 1982); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-3601(G) (Supp. 1986).
111. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 96.
112. MONOGRAPH, supra note 67, at 27.
113. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 110.
114. Id.
115. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 110 (citing A. Ganley & L. Harris, Domestic
Violence: Issues in Designing and Implementing Programs for Male Batterers (Aug. 29,
1978) (unpublished paper presented to the American Psychological Association)).
116. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 110.
117. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.37(lm)(b) (West 1985); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3601(G) (Supp. 1986).
118. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 136. But see Dreas, Ignator & Brennan,
The Male Batterer: A Model Treatment Program for the Courts, 46 FED. PROBATION
50, 51 (1982).
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B. What Characteristics of an Individual Case Make It More or Less
Appropriate for Diversion?
Characteristics specific to domestic violence cases make some of-
fenders particularly appropriate for diversion programs. Model statutes
list some criteria to assist prosecutors in deciding which offenders are
appropriate for diversion," 9 but most statutes merely provide for pro-
secutorial or judicial discretion.2 0 The model state act prepared by Lisa
G. Lerman 2 1 lists several eligibility criteria intended to guide prosecutors
in determining who should be admitted to the diversion program. 22 The
model statute section provides that the prosecutor, after finding that
the defendant fulfills all the mandatory requirements, shall assess whether
the defendant is likely to complete the diversion program successfully. 2
The defendant's motivation to stop battering, and any other factors
indicating that the defendant would benefit from counseling, should be
considered. 24 It has been suggested that the idea of family unity alone
is not reason enough to divert an offender, otherwise all domestic cases
would be diverted. It may, however, be a strong motivating factor in
the case of some batterers which will produce a greater likelihood that
counseling will succeed in changing the abuser's violent behavior. 25
Thus, the very characteristic that makes prosecution more difficult 26
makes the case all the more appropriate for diversion. A defendant's
desire to maintain a job so he may provide for himself and his family
is another potential motivating factor. 27 The victim's consent, if not an
eligibility requirement, should also be considered in assessing the de-
fendant's likely success in a diversion program in recognition that the
victim knows the batterer better than the prosecutor, and stands to lose
the most if diversion is unsuccessful. 128 A victim's positive attitude
toward diversion may be indicative of its potential success.
After considering the factors which may make pretrial diversion more
appropriate for a particular offender, consideration must be given to
those factors which weigh heavily against diverting a spouse batterer.
Lerman's model diversion statute also suggests factors pointing toward
prosecution rather than diversion for the abuser. 29 If the injury inflicted
119. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 136.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 93-104.
121. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 136-37.
122. Id. at 137.
123. Id. at 136.
124. Id. at 137.
125. Waits, supra note 83, at 325.
126. The desire to maintain a family relationship is the cause of much case attrition.
L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 19-20.
127. Waits, supra note 80, at 325.
128. Id. at 326.
129. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 137.
432
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upon the victim is severe, prosecution is the preferred choice. 30 Batterers
charged with inflicting severe injuries should not be diverted, at least
at the pretrial phase, because diversion does not send a strong enough
message that their conduct is socially unacceptable.13' Additionally, if
the victim discloses an extensive history of previous incidents of domestic
violence by the defendant, diversion would be inappropriate for the same
reason. 32 Finally, if the defendant has a significant criminal record, this
too weighs against diversion 33 A defendant with a significant criminal
record may be inappropriate for diversion, regardless of whether his
prior crimes were acts of violence, because the defendant is "wise" to
the criminal justice system. 3 4 This type of defendant may use the
diversion program as an easy way out of the charge with no commitment
to dealing with his violence.'35
As previously mentioned, victim consent is given weight in the eli-
gibility determination. Because a battered spouse tends to minimize her
assailant's actions, she should be believed when she indicates that
diversion will not deter her partner's violence. 36 It would be rare for
a victim to withhold consent in a case where a conscientious prosecutor
seeks diversion. 37 Thus, opposition by the victim should be accorded
great influence in the diversion determination. An additional factor
which demonstrates that a particular defendant is not likely to benefit
from diversion is whether the batterer has previously participated in
counseling programs. If so, it demonstrates that counseling has not
altered the behavior. 3 Consequently, those defendants must be assessed
stiffer penalties for their violence in the hope that an increased penalty
will increase motivation for change. 139
C. External Factors That Must Be Considered in Determining if Pretrial
Diversion of Spouse Abuse Cases Will Work
Although the particulars of each domestic violence case must be
considered in determining whether diversion will be effective in reha-
bilitating a certain defendant, many external factors are also important
130. Id.
131. Waits, supra note 83, at 325.
132. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 137.
133. Id.
134. L. LERMAN, supra note 5, at 102.
135. Id.
136. Waits, supra note 83, at 326.
137. Id. at n.332.
138. Id. at 325.
139. Id.
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when considering the potential success of a diversionary program. The
largest concerns are with the attitude of the community toward domestic
violence, the attitude of the prosecutors' offices, and the attitude of the
police.
From the standpoint of the community, "consistent diversion of do-
mestic violence cases to social services and private remedies commu-
nicates the message that domestic violence is a private matter, not a
serious crime."' 140 In a community where pretrial diversion programs
have not been used with other criminal offenses, diversion of domestic
abuse only perpetuates the idea that domestic violence is less criminal
behavior than other offenses. This is a primary argument that diversion
sanctions the underenforcement of the criminal law against spouse
batterers.14 1 This argument, however, loses its force when other non-
domestic criminal offenders, including other violent offenders, are treated
similarly.
In addition to community attitudes, resources available in a given
community are also a large determinant of a formal pretrial diversion
program's success. Without appropriate social programs or agencies and
funds to maintain such programs, there is no place to divert offenders.
Diversion programs cannot be successful by merely channeling batterers
away from prosecution. Alternative programs, such as private and group
counseling, must be available to provide treatment and deterrence of
the violent behavior.
The attitude of the police force is also a crucial determinant of
success. If police are unresponsive to domestic disturbance calls, or
unwilling to make arrests, the batterer will not become subject to any
diversion program. At present, very few abuse calls lead to arrest. 42
Increased arrests of spouse abusers sends a message to communities
that such conduct is wrong and will not be tolerated, 143 and gives
prosecution or diversion its desired effectiveness. To this end, police
must be educated in the goals of the diversion program and its effec-
tiveness so that they do not perceive their arrest efforts as wasted. A
statutorily imposed duty to arrest in all domestic abuse cases where
probable cause is present would provide a clear statement that arrest
is the appropriate course of action. 44 This would combat the effect of
traditional views held by police that domestic violence is not a serious
crime, and would give a legislative push toward requiring arrests. War-
rantless arrest provisions are also necessary to encourage arrests for
misdemeanors committed outside the officer's presence. 45
140. Note, supra note 76, at 737.
141. A Model State Act, supra note 84, at 135.
142. Id. at 127.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The police, however, can only activate the legal process. 46 It is up
to the prosecutor to initiate and ensure the success of diversion pro-
grams. 47 There are two actions a prosecutor can take that undermine
any chance of a pretrial diversion program's success. The first is to use
the diversion program as a dumping ground for all domestic cases.
Diversion may be appropriate in some cases, "but these programs
should not be used merely as a device to reduce the caseload of 'minor
disputes' without regard to the needs of the battered spouses, the
offenders, and society's interest in the censure of domestic violence."' 48
Not only does this fail to properly resolve the domestic violence problem
and treat the conduct as truly criminal, it perpetuates the attitude that
domestic violence is not a serious crime worthy of prosecution. This
type of action also discourages the police from making proper arrests
if those arrests are not given serious consideration for prosecution.
The second action a prosecutor can take that undermines the success
of a diversion program is the failure to follow up unsuccessful diversion
with the conditionally deferred prosecution. The most important safe-
guard in insuring the proper use of pretrial diversion is the prosecutor's
staunch commitment to the reinstatement of charges if the batterer
engages in violent conduct, 49 or is otherwise unsuccessful in the diversion
program. "This commitment must be unequivocally communicated to
the batterer so he knows counselling cannot be used to evade respon-
sibility for his actions."1 50 Careful supervision is essential, allowing
immediate prosecution if the batterer fails to comply with the terms of
the diversion program.' 5'
IV. CONCLUSION
How can law enforcement officials treat spouse battering as criminal
behavior, yet respect the familial relationship that exists between the
batterer and his victim? This Note has suggested that formal pretrial
diversion of spouse abuse cases is the solution to this dilemma. Informal
diversion attempts at combatting the spouse abuse problem have not
been successful in providing the necessary deterrence of the offender,
or in communicating clearly to society that spousal abuse is a criminal
offense.
As important as the initial attempts were in leading up to an effective
solution, they did not provide a resolution. While formal pretrial diversion
146. Waits, supra note 83, at 321.
147. Id.
148. Note, supra note 76, at 737.
149. Waits, supra note 83, at 326.
150. Id.
151. Note, supra note 76, at 738.
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appears at first impression to be just another way to avoid serious
criminal prosecution of spousal violence, closer analysis indicates that
the process may finally lead to the successful treatment and deterrence
of violent behavior. Unlike earlier attempts made to distinguish domestic
violence from similar crimes between strangers, formal pretrial diversion
is an appropriate combination of criminal deterrence and punishment
through prosecution with initial attempts at rehabilitating the offender
who is willing to recognize and correct his violent behavior.
Admittedly, every community will not accept the diversion of such
cases without perceiving that family violence is being treated in a
noncriminal manner. However, given the proper environment in which
police and prosecutors are willing to support a program, that message
will not be communicated to the public. The prosecutors' unwillingness
to use diversion as a dumping ground for spousal abuse cases, and a
staunch commitment to reinstituting prosecution in unsuccessful diversion
cases will protect the integrity of a formal diversion program in the
eyes of the community, the victim, and the offender. Statutory eligibility
requirements maintain consistent application of programs, while assuring
that repeat offenders do not use the process to avoid criminal culpability
for their actions.
Although violence between intimates is recognized as criminal be-
havior, the relationship that exists between the batterer and the victim
cannot be ignored. Effective deterrence and treatment strategies are
carried out on two fronts: through the legal system, and through social
service agencies. Formal pretrial diversion provides a method to suc-
cessfully combine both.
Diane E. Reynolds
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